Torii Hunter, step right up:
"People see dark faces out there, and the perception is that they're African American," Los Angeles Angels center fielder Torii Hunter says. "They're not us. They're impostors."
"Even people I know come up and say, 'Hey, what color is Vladimir Guerrero? Is he a black player?' I say, 'Come on, he's Dominican. He's not black.'"
Scott Boras, no stranger to idiotic statements, supports his player with trademark hide-the-ball, divert-the-enemy flourish:
"The colleges have corrupted baseball," says Boras, whose son plays at Southern California, "because they have taken away the scholarships. They've taken away America's pastime from the grass-root level of homes."
Putting these two quotes together, it seems Torii should have gone to college and learned a new trade, since baseball is likely to go the way of the Detroit, in his mind. Or, perhaps he could have taken a statistics class or two so that he could understand that it is a far more complicated question.
Wednesday, March 10, 2010
Thursday, March 4, 2010
Defending Youk
Reading through the blogs this evening, I found a rather interesting take on statistics from Kevin Youkilis. Reaction from my fellow Interneters was swift, and a bit harsh from where I sit. Among his choicest barbs:
Youk and his brethren get a fair amount of ridicule for throwing out the baby with the bathwater (see Jeff Francoeur here). It seems like everyday, one of the meatheads is caught in print dismissing prized on base percentage like it was Fox's newest asinine iteration of hitting with runners in scoring position.
But when I think about baseball players’ main interaction with stats, I start to see green. And therein lies the root of the dissonance between players and stats.
Baseball players are taught from an early age to play their asses of for the good of the team. No relevant stats are kept until these guys are in college or the minors, and have racked up about 11 or 12 springs and summers on the diamond (even more for Caribbean players, as I assume they are given a broom handle and roundish rocks out of the womb). Playing for stats is a way of life for the fantasy-crazed, box score junkie, but it is an uncomfortable second language for players.
More specifically, Youk’s comments belie the fears of many players: unfair judgment by club brass on the basis of cherry-picked stats. AAAA-types know damn well that 100 at-bats in September or spring training don't prove much, but they also know that poor numbers mean a return trip back to the land of bus rides and Taco Bell. An arbitration-eligible player must feel a particular strike at his manhood when his ability to stick in the major leagues for three years earns them a subpeona to baseball court, where clubs brings out the heavy artillery to chip away at his value. Free agents must cringe when their value is distorted by the asinine Elias system. Even at the end of a player’s career, one or two down months transforms them into a case of “inevitable decline,” whereby clubs shy away from them as though they were leprosy patients shedding handfuls of skin.
Such is the life of a baseball player, and it’s certainly still a charmed one. Yet I completely understand why they don’t trust numerical analysis, and resent attempts to pin value to them.
No, we don’t. I’ve learned a lot about all different kind of stats we have going now. Some of them are just ridiculous, because if you break down all the stuff, you can find a negative and a positive in every single player. And that’s what I think they do, throw out so many different ones so every guy either looks really good or a little less down on the level playing field.
Youk and his brethren get a fair amount of ridicule for throwing out the baby with the bathwater (see Jeff Francoeur here). It seems like everyday, one of the meatheads is caught in print dismissing prized on base percentage like it was Fox's newest asinine iteration of hitting with runners in scoring position.
But when I think about baseball players’ main interaction with stats, I start to see green. And therein lies the root of the dissonance between players and stats.
Baseball players are taught from an early age to play their asses of for the good of the team. No relevant stats are kept until these guys are in college or the minors, and have racked up about 11 or 12 springs and summers on the diamond (even more for Caribbean players, as I assume they are given a broom handle and roundish rocks out of the womb). Playing for stats is a way of life for the fantasy-crazed, box score junkie, but it is an uncomfortable second language for players.
More specifically, Youk’s comments belie the fears of many players: unfair judgment by club brass on the basis of cherry-picked stats. AAAA-types know damn well that 100 at-bats in September or spring training don't prove much, but they also know that poor numbers mean a return trip back to the land of bus rides and Taco Bell. An arbitration-eligible player must feel a particular strike at his manhood when his ability to stick in the major leagues for three years earns them a subpeona to baseball court, where clubs brings out the heavy artillery to chip away at his value. Free agents must cringe when their value is distorted by the asinine Elias system. Even at the end of a player’s career, one or two down months transforms them into a case of “inevitable decline,” whereby clubs shy away from them as though they were leprosy patients shedding handfuls of skin.
Such is the life of a baseball player, and it’s certainly still a charmed one. Yet I completely understand why they don’t trust numerical analysis, and resent attempts to pin value to them.
Tuesday, January 26, 2010
2010 Firesale Watch: Arizona Diamondbacks
Given the title, you might think I am taking a cue from Phoenix radio blowhards who still pine for the days of Randy Johnson and Luis Gonzalez. Let’s get this straight: the DBacks are clearly not a 70-92 team. The 2009 season had barely begun before Arizona lost its #1 starter (Brandon Webb) and best on-base threat (Conor Jackson). Very few teams would have performed well after losing such a combo. However, the most common explanations for losses were cries that “AZ has too many sluggers” and “the DBacks bullpen is shaky,” a classic diagnosis of the symptoms of the problem, rather than the problem simpliciter.
The DBacks should be good this year if they avoid injuries. Yet, in an improved NL West, “good” might only be good for third or fourth place. This reality certainly magnifies the tragedy of the 2008 DBacks’ late-season collapse to the Dodgers, since the extra playoff revenue would certainly have helped the 2009 DBacks construct a team that could have coped better with injury problems. It also shows that the DBacks as currently operated – a mid-market, mid-payroll team – should be thinking about rebuilding, whether or not they make the playoffs. The current roster will soon get too expensive to maintain. Furthermore, the building blocks for a quick rebuild exist, in terms of above-replacement level talent on the major league bench and in AAA, and in the form of premium trade bait.
The DBacks will likely enter 2010 with a payroll around $80 million. Even if the team succeeds in finishing ahead of one of the NL West’s two 2009 playoff teams, the Dodgers and the Rockies, and the pitching-heavy Giants, they are unlikely to have the money to keep the team together going into 2011. To start, while the DBacks only have $25M in 2011 payroll commitments, those commitments are locked up in three players: Dan Haren, Chris Snyder and Chris Young. Assuming Webb rebounds to pre-2009 performance, he will likely get $15M or more per year on the free agent market. Edwin Jackson will likely made $10M in his final year of arbitration, and Adam LaRoche’s 2011 option is $11M. Add another $30M for Conor Jackson, Stephen Drew, Miguel Montero, Kelly Johnson and first-time eligibles Justin Upton and Mark Reynolds (expect a huge raise given his power numbers), and the team has spent $90M on 12 players.
Suppose the DBacks let LaRoche walk and replace him with AAA stud Brandon Allen. In that case, the DBacks would have to use that $9.5M ($11M – LaRoche’s $1.5M buyout for 2011) to fill out a bullpen left vacant by the expected free agency of closer Chad Qualls and anticipated set-up men Aaron Heilman and Bobby Howry. Even if the DBacks filled out roster spots 16-25 with minimum salary players, their payroll would be at least $95M in 2011, and likely over $110M for 2012, given contract and arbitration raises. Given the ownership’s stated goals of avoiding the massive debts of the 2001 championship team, and the lackluster ticket numbers at Chase Field the past few seasons, it is unlikely Arizona can hold such a payroll even if they make the playoffs.
You may wonder if Arizona’s fan support would plummet to Marlins-like levels if ownership sold away fan favorites. Perhaps this is true, but Arizona has the organizational depth to be decently competitive for a season or two while rebuilding, and be ready to welcome back front-runner fans by 2012. Looking at Dan Symborski’s 2010 ZIPS projections, the DBacks have several players on the bench or in the minors who have the potential to provide near league average production.* Jeff Bailey in LF, Gerardo Parra and Cole Gillespie in CF, Ryan Roberts and Tony Abreu at 2B/SS/3B could all fill in suitably for traded veterans until fresh troops are available. So, Arizona is not looking at a Pittsburgh-like cycle of perpetual rebuilding.
Speaking of fresh troops, the DBacks should be able to get several good ones if they do start trading at mid-season. The prize would be Haren, a consistent, durable ace-level pitcher in his prime who is signed will below market value (less than $34M for the next 3 years) should net a Roy Halladay-like return. Although he is not an ace, another good season from Edwin Jackson will establish him as an above-average starter who can help any rotation without requiring a risky long-term contract commitment. While Reynolds and Montero have their detractors in the field, both are plus hitters for their position and will be arbitration-eligible for multiple seasons. They would be most valuable to teams looking to contend on a budget. Further down the list, Conor Jackson, Drew and Johnson could all be mid-season trade bait if their 2010 stats recover from 2009 lows to provide good production at arbitration rates. Looking long-term, Webb and Qualls could net Arizona several high 2011 draft picks if they are not traded and avoid an offer of arbitration.
While the Rockies and the Dodgers have been quiet and cheap this offseason, and the Giants have continued to fill out their everyday roster with mediocrity, all three possess talent equivalent or better to Arizona. Recalibrating for a run in 2012-2013, when franchise cornerstone Justin Upton can be complemented by current top prospects Jarrod Parker and Brandon Allen, as well as others acquired in the trades suggested above, makes a lot of baseball sense (and cents).
*Near league average production: at least a “Fair” defensive grade and an OPS+ within 5 units of average production for the given position on the ZIPS projections.
The DBacks should be good this year if they avoid injuries. Yet, in an improved NL West, “good” might only be good for third or fourth place. This reality certainly magnifies the tragedy of the 2008 DBacks’ late-season collapse to the Dodgers, since the extra playoff revenue would certainly have helped the 2009 DBacks construct a team that could have coped better with injury problems. It also shows that the DBacks as currently operated – a mid-market, mid-payroll team – should be thinking about rebuilding, whether or not they make the playoffs. The current roster will soon get too expensive to maintain. Furthermore, the building blocks for a quick rebuild exist, in terms of above-replacement level talent on the major league bench and in AAA, and in the form of premium trade bait.
The DBacks will likely enter 2010 with a payroll around $80 million. Even if the team succeeds in finishing ahead of one of the NL West’s two 2009 playoff teams, the Dodgers and the Rockies, and the pitching-heavy Giants, they are unlikely to have the money to keep the team together going into 2011. To start, while the DBacks only have $25M in 2011 payroll commitments, those commitments are locked up in three players: Dan Haren, Chris Snyder and Chris Young. Assuming Webb rebounds to pre-2009 performance, he will likely get $15M or more per year on the free agent market. Edwin Jackson will likely made $10M in his final year of arbitration, and Adam LaRoche’s 2011 option is $11M. Add another $30M for Conor Jackson, Stephen Drew, Miguel Montero, Kelly Johnson and first-time eligibles Justin Upton and Mark Reynolds (expect a huge raise given his power numbers), and the team has spent $90M on 12 players.
Suppose the DBacks let LaRoche walk and replace him with AAA stud Brandon Allen. In that case, the DBacks would have to use that $9.5M ($11M – LaRoche’s $1.5M buyout for 2011) to fill out a bullpen left vacant by the expected free agency of closer Chad Qualls and anticipated set-up men Aaron Heilman and Bobby Howry. Even if the DBacks filled out roster spots 16-25 with minimum salary players, their payroll would be at least $95M in 2011, and likely over $110M for 2012, given contract and arbitration raises. Given the ownership’s stated goals of avoiding the massive debts of the 2001 championship team, and the lackluster ticket numbers at Chase Field the past few seasons, it is unlikely Arizona can hold such a payroll even if they make the playoffs.
You may wonder if Arizona’s fan support would plummet to Marlins-like levels if ownership sold away fan favorites. Perhaps this is true, but Arizona has the organizational depth to be decently competitive for a season or two while rebuilding, and be ready to welcome back front-runner fans by 2012. Looking at Dan Symborski’s 2010 ZIPS projections, the DBacks have several players on the bench or in the minors who have the potential to provide near league average production.* Jeff Bailey in LF, Gerardo Parra and Cole Gillespie in CF, Ryan Roberts and Tony Abreu at 2B/SS/3B could all fill in suitably for traded veterans until fresh troops are available. So, Arizona is not looking at a Pittsburgh-like cycle of perpetual rebuilding.
Speaking of fresh troops, the DBacks should be able to get several good ones if they do start trading at mid-season. The prize would be Haren, a consistent, durable ace-level pitcher in his prime who is signed will below market value (less than $34M for the next 3 years) should net a Roy Halladay-like return. Although he is not an ace, another good season from Edwin Jackson will establish him as an above-average starter who can help any rotation without requiring a risky long-term contract commitment. While Reynolds and Montero have their detractors in the field, both are plus hitters for their position and will be arbitration-eligible for multiple seasons. They would be most valuable to teams looking to contend on a budget. Further down the list, Conor Jackson, Drew and Johnson could all be mid-season trade bait if their 2010 stats recover from 2009 lows to provide good production at arbitration rates. Looking long-term, Webb and Qualls could net Arizona several high 2011 draft picks if they are not traded and avoid an offer of arbitration.
While the Rockies and the Dodgers have been quiet and cheap this offseason, and the Giants have continued to fill out their everyday roster with mediocrity, all three possess talent equivalent or better to Arizona. Recalibrating for a run in 2012-2013, when franchise cornerstone Justin Upton can be complemented by current top prospects Jarrod Parker and Brandon Allen, as well as others acquired in the trades suggested above, makes a lot of baseball sense (and cents).
*Near league average production: at least a “Fair” defensive grade and an OPS+ within 5 units of average production for the given position on the ZIPS projections.
Monday, January 25, 2010
Pirates Offseason: In Focus
The Neal Huntington era in Pittsburgh has hit a crossroads. Young talent is starting to percolate into the major leagues, and expectations are starting to rise. Most fans are realistic enough not to expect a playoff contender, but they do want signs that this iteration of Bucs management is not feeding them false hope. The recent signings of Octavio Dotel, DJ Carrasco and Brendan Donnelly have been chided by some as the same kind of uninspired free agent spending that has sunk the Pirates repeatedly.
Modern baseball analysis is particularly hard on relief pitching. Statistics like WAR take a macro view of individual baseball players, valuing things like total innings played over singular instances of greatness. In this way, average starting pitchers are typically worth many wins more than even the best relief pitcher. When free agent signings are analyzed through such a prism, the analysis is usually harsh on the team signing relievers. Even when leveraged appropriately (i.e. the best relievers face the best hitters, be it in the 7th, 8th or 9th inning), relievers are not thought of as particularly valuable. Add in the success of teams that have eschewed the 7th inning guy/set-up man/closer – the Rays of the past few seasons come to mind – and the party line from modern baseball analysts should be that the Pirates are up to old tricks.
But there is good reason to like the Pirates’ signings. For one, the total commitment is just over $5.5M, assuming Carrasco makes the team out of spring training. Dotel’s incentives and buyout could push this total up towards $7M, but given the Pirates lack of spending this offseason, as well as the recent mandate by MLB for the Florida Marlins to direct revenue sharing money towards player contracts, that figure shouldn’t be a problem either. In essence, the Pirates took advantage of a fungible market commodity (relief pitching) and made it do the work the Pirates need (several arms to support a young pitching staff with only 3 200+ inning outings to date) at an acceptable price.
Some fans bemoaned the non-tendering and free agent loss of the Pirates’ most promising relief pitcher, Matt Capps. Their argument wonders why a rebuilding team would not keep its best young arms in the pen. This argument misses the inherent fungibility of relief pitching. As several writers have pointed out, in an era where so many good, but not starter quality arms exist, and the value of the best relief pitchers on the market is routinely tamped down by the draft pick compensation mechanism of arbitration, the free market price of relief pitching is lowered (likely approaching its actual value as calculated by WAR and its statistical brethren).
Another problem specific to Capps for the Pirates is that his pre-free agency status does not make him the same bargain most other players are before free agency. Rather than approach arbitration with Capps, whose value would likely be inflated by previous save totals without a sufficient debit for more recent erratic performance, the Pirates simply chose different commodities on the market. If Dotel, Carrasco and Donnelly don’t work out, they can simply try new combinations next year. There is certainly a risk in a breakout performance by Capps, but there is no statistical reason to prefer him to Dotel in 2010. Since they signed for the same price, the advantage goes to Pittsburgh.
Rather than lock up funds with a more flashy free agent signing of a starting pitcher or everyday position player who may block a promising prospect, the Pirates chose to replenish a spent bullpen that can hopefully support the team in close games. Given the team’s consistent underperformance of its Pythagorean predicted record, such action 2010 appears to be a prudent decision, despite its uninspiring appearance.
Modern baseball analysis is particularly hard on relief pitching. Statistics like WAR take a macro view of individual baseball players, valuing things like total innings played over singular instances of greatness. In this way, average starting pitchers are typically worth many wins more than even the best relief pitcher. When free agent signings are analyzed through such a prism, the analysis is usually harsh on the team signing relievers. Even when leveraged appropriately (i.e. the best relievers face the best hitters, be it in the 7th, 8th or 9th inning), relievers are not thought of as particularly valuable. Add in the success of teams that have eschewed the 7th inning guy/set-up man/closer – the Rays of the past few seasons come to mind – and the party line from modern baseball analysts should be that the Pirates are up to old tricks.
But there is good reason to like the Pirates’ signings. For one, the total commitment is just over $5.5M, assuming Carrasco makes the team out of spring training. Dotel’s incentives and buyout could push this total up towards $7M, but given the Pirates lack of spending this offseason, as well as the recent mandate by MLB for the Florida Marlins to direct revenue sharing money towards player contracts, that figure shouldn’t be a problem either. In essence, the Pirates took advantage of a fungible market commodity (relief pitching) and made it do the work the Pirates need (several arms to support a young pitching staff with only 3 200+ inning outings to date) at an acceptable price.
Some fans bemoaned the non-tendering and free agent loss of the Pirates’ most promising relief pitcher, Matt Capps. Their argument wonders why a rebuilding team would not keep its best young arms in the pen. This argument misses the inherent fungibility of relief pitching. As several writers have pointed out, in an era where so many good, but not starter quality arms exist, and the value of the best relief pitchers on the market is routinely tamped down by the draft pick compensation mechanism of arbitration, the free market price of relief pitching is lowered (likely approaching its actual value as calculated by WAR and its statistical brethren).
Another problem specific to Capps for the Pirates is that his pre-free agency status does not make him the same bargain most other players are before free agency. Rather than approach arbitration with Capps, whose value would likely be inflated by previous save totals without a sufficient debit for more recent erratic performance, the Pirates simply chose different commodities on the market. If Dotel, Carrasco and Donnelly don’t work out, they can simply try new combinations next year. There is certainly a risk in a breakout performance by Capps, but there is no statistical reason to prefer him to Dotel in 2010. Since they signed for the same price, the advantage goes to Pittsburgh.
Rather than lock up funds with a more flashy free agent signing of a starting pitcher or everyday position player who may block a promising prospect, the Pirates chose to replenish a spent bullpen that can hopefully support the team in close games. Given the team’s consistent underperformance of its Pythagorean predicted record, such action 2010 appears to be a prudent decision, despite its uninspiring appearance.
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